

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Investigations

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ORIGINATOR:

25X1A



Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

5 Oct 76

Date

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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
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Att: DDA 76-4972			
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
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(40)

ADDA: MJMalanick (26 Oct 76)

Distribution:

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Att: Memo dtd 7 Oct 76 to DDCI fr Acting
DDA, subj Counterintelligence
Investigations

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Counterintelligence Investigations

FROM:

Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

EXTENSION

6777

NO.

DATE

5 OCT 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Acting DD/A
7D-24 Headquarters

7 OCT 1976

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ASST. TO DDCI

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*duc*3. ~~DDCI~~
~~7E-12 Headquarters~~

4. A/DDA

m

5.

6. D/Security
4E-60 Headquarters

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15.

2 to 4:

Executive Registry.

Mike:

76-5409/1

I would like to come and discuss this with you at your earliest convenience.  has some suggestions which I agree with. It involves the inadequacy of our regulations on certain subjects, which you will remember was discussed at the first meeting of the Regulations Task Force chaired by Tony Lapham.

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3-62610 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS☐ SECRET☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ INTERNAL
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Substitute for [REDACTED]

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c. RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) DIRECTOR OF SECURITY. The Director of Security is responsible for:

- (a) Notifying the Director of Central Intelligence of any active counterintelligence investigation of a specific Agency employee and keeping him informed of pertinent developments. The Director of Security and the Director of Central Intelligence will review pertinent data and determine the appropriateness of informing any other Responsible Authority. Once a Responsible Authority is so advised, the counterintelligence investigation conducted on the subject will be concluded within one year unless extended by the Director of Central Intelligence.
- (b) Within the specific limitations of (a) above notify the Responsible Authority concerned of any matter affecting the security of his operations:
- (c) As written
- (d) As written
- (e) As written

SECRET

DD/A Registry

The

Security

19 OCT 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

25X1A FROM

: [REDACTED]
Acting Director of Security

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SUBJECT

: Suspected Tampering with Photo-processing
Equipment [REDACTED]1. This memorandum is for your information only.

2. On 1 October 1976, this Office was notified by the Chief of Security, [REDACTED] (site) that there had been a series of suspicious incidents which would indicate that someone may have been tampering with the photo-processing equipment. Over a three-week period, knobs, screws, and valves on the machines had been found in positions other than normal; level settings had been changed, and finally, on 30 September, a wire had been discovered severed. This particular section of the Project is manned by employees [REDACTED] Incorporated, under contract to the Agency. The personnel are all cleared for appropriate compartmented security access approvals. The operation requires a 24-hour, seven-day schedule with four crews of approximately 19 people each, working on alternating shifts. Most of the reported incidents occurred during the duty time of one particular shift.

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3. A security file review of all four crews was accomplished with no leads. Chief of OD&E Security therefore requested that this Office conduct interviews of the [REDACTED] shift workers most closely associated with the machines in question. These interviews were accomplished [REDACTED] between 8 and 14 October,

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with a total of 70 persons being interviewed. No personnel were identified as having any connection with deliberate tampering with machine settings. It was generally believed that the reported events were the result of human error, carelessness, maintenance malfunction, forgetfulness, or the inevitable "gremlins" connected with machine operations. The most perplexing incident, the severed wire, caused great concern among most employees interviewed; however, several of the operationally knowledgeable personnel advised that this, too, was most likely a machine malfunction.

4. As a result of our investigation, it is the conclusion of the Office of Security that there has been no intentional tampering with the photo-processing equipment, and that the problems were most likely caused by human error.

5. We have briefed appropriate Directorate of Science and Technology officials concerning the results of our inquiry, and we are in the process of preparing a formal written report. Most certainly you will be kept advised if there are any significant new developments.

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